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Understanding	How	Foreign	Influence	and	Strongman	Policies	Prevent	Democracy	in	Egypt		Devin	Smith			Devin	Smith	is	a	Diplomacy	and	International	Relations	major	at	Seton	Hall	University	with	a	Middle	Eastern	Studies	minor	planning	to	graduate	in	May	>?>@.	The	objective	of	his	thesis	was	to	investigate	the	factors	that	prevent	the	spread	of	democracy	in	Egypt.	Upon	graduation,	Devin	hopes	to	find	a	job	in	the	nonprofit	sector.			 	
 ith the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the fall of authoritarian regimes 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
in the early 1990s, it appeared that global 
democracy was on the rise in what scholars 
have called “Democracy’s Third Wave”. 
Countries previously thought extremely 
unlikely to become susceptible to democratic 
movements, such as Poland in 1989, had 
finally overthrown the shackles of autocratic 
communism and transitioned towards 
democratic rule. However, as more countries 
than ever before began the tumultuous journey 
towards democracy, the Arab world largely 
remained stagnant behind the curtain of 
authoritarianism. 
      Egypt in particular remained strongly 
behind the fulcrum of autocracy even as it 
seemed that the world was largely leaving 
autocratic leaders such as Egypt’s Hosni 
Mubarak behind. “During the 1980s and 
1990s, as dictatorships in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia collapsed, 
Egypt’s autocracy stood firm. Although 
opposition movements across the developing 
world vaulted into power through dramatic 
election victories, President Mubarak thwarted 
kindred campaigns against his rule. (Mubarak) 
seemed to exercise almost unparalleled 
domination and to have an extraordinary 
ability to preserve (his) own incumbency  	
1 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of 
Democratization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 122. 
while preparing the way for their chosen 
successors”1.  
      While Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s longest-
serving self-styled ‘president’, seemed 
entrenched against any sort of opposition that 
sought to even remotely stymie his wide-
reaching power, the 2011 Arab Spring protests 
proved that even modern Egypt’s longest 
serving president was not immune to a mass 
popular uprising.  
In the case of Egypt’s centralized executive 
arena, unanticipated but relentless popular 
protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square as well as 
other major squares across every major city 
overwhelmed the Interior Ministry’s 
security apparatus. By physically defeating 
the security forces in pitched street battles 
over four days, protesters effectively shut 
down the country. This caused the military 
to intervene and deploy personnel and 
armored vehicles into the streets on January 
28. During the tense days after the military 
deployed and before Mubarak stepped 
down on February 11, the NDP faded from 
existence. The party’s paralyzed state was 
complemented by the disappearance of the 
police and security forces. As the standoff 
continued, Egyptians and the world 
watched anxiously whether the military 
would open fire on the protesters. The 
military, which has extensive economic 
interests and has served as a regime’s core 
since 1952, reiterated the promise that it 
W	
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would not. Time eventually ran out for 
Mubarak and his executive elites as the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) nudged them out the door.2 
The removal of Hosni Mubarak from power 
served as a powerful, inspirational message to 
the Egyptian people that real change, however 
unlikely it may have seemed, was possible.  
The first round of presidential elections 
occurred on May 23–24, 2012. 
Muhammad Morsi, a senior Muslim 
Brotherhood leader and president of the 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party 
(FJP), came in first with 24.8 percent of 
the vote. Ahmad Shafiq, a former military 
officer and Mubarak protégé who briefly 
served as prime minister in early 2011, 
won 23.7 percent… (Morsi) campaigned 
as the “candidate of the revolution” who 
would fight against the counter-
revolutionary forces in the military, the 
judiciary, and the security services. 
Morsi’s efforts were successful. He won 
52 percent of the vote to Shafiq’s 48 
percent. The military accepted Shafiq’s 
defeat and allowed Morsi to assume office. 
For the first time in Egypt’s 5,000-year 
history, the country had an elected national 
leader. In his inaugural address, Morsi 
promised to be the president of all 
Egyptians and to build a new Egypt that is 
“civil, national, constitutional, and 
modern.3 
Unfortunately, Egypt’s experiment with 
democracy did not prove to be a lasting one. 
On July 3, 2013 the Egyptian Armed Forces 
removed Morsi from power barely a year after 
had been sworn in. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a 
former general in the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces of Egypt and former Director of 	
2 Joshua Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats : Regime Power 
in Egypt and Syria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2012), 158. 
3 Bruce Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, 
Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World (New York, 
NY: Princeton University Press, 2008), XII-XIII. 
Military Intelligence, assumed the presidency 
with a dubious 96% of the vote in 2014.4 He 
has remained in power ever since. 
      Egypt, with the exception of the brief 
presidency of Mohamed Morsi, has remained 
mostly thoroughly autocratic since Gamal 
Nasser’s ascension to the presidency in 1954. 
But why is that the case? In this thesis, I will 
argue that a combination of foreign influence 
from Western and other Arab states, religious 
extremism and sectarianism, and entrenched 
political interests within Egypt all play a hand 
in undermining democracy in Egypt. It is my 
opinion that lasting, free democracy in Egypt, 
however unlikely, will always be possible if 
these hurdles can somehow be overcame. 
      Egypt, with a population of 95 million 
people, has the largest population in the 
Middle East and plays an important role as a 
regional power and key US ally in a 
constantly volatile region of the world. While 
it may seem counterintuitive for the United 
States, which is often seen as a key 
liberalizing global force, to continuously ally 
itself with and support an autocratic state such 
as Egypt, it is largely within the United States’ 
interest to support and reinforce the status 
quo. “Rather than fostering democracy in an 
incremental fashion, U.S. and Egyptian 
officials have promoted an autocratic security 
state that supports a U.S.-led regional order 
built around Israeli security and the projection 
of U.S. influence over the Persian Gulf. By 
contrast, public opinion in Egypt favors a 
regional security order less dominated by the 
United States and Israel, and a government 
that respects political competition and civil 
liberties”5. However, as the successive 
military regimes in Egypt show, it is not 
4 “Egypt election: Sisi secures landslide win,” BBC 
News, 29 May 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-27614776.	
5 Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention : The Politics 
of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3. 
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Egyptian public opinion that drives the 
government to action.  
      Further working against the will of the 
Egyptian people is how strongly the United 
States supports autocratic regimes in Egypt 
when deemed to be beneficial for Washington. 
“The problem for Washington was not that 
pro-U.S. authoritarianism would be followed 
by more authoritarianism, but that the 
successor government, democratic or not, 
could turn Egyptian policies away from U.S. 
preferences. Hence, U.S. officials worked to 
check Islamic political activity, either by 
cultivating a liberal option between the NDP 
(Mubarak’s National Democratic Party) and 
the Muslim Brotherhood or by squarely 
backing Mubarak”6. 	EARLY	AMERICAN-	EGYPTIAN	RELATIONS	
In order to best understand the relationship 
between Cairo and Washington, and later 
Cairo and other Gulf States, it is important to 
consider the history of relations between the 
two, dating back to Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat’s split with Moscow. While there were 
relations between Cairo and Washington 
dating back to the 1952 coup d’état, Cairo had 
severed relations with Washington completely 
following the devastation that Egypt faced in 
1967’s Six Day War against Israel7. Israel, the 
United States’ key Middle Eastern partner, 
preemptively struck Egyptian airfields, 
effectively crippling the Egyptian air force 
and paving the way for the relatively easy 
Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and 
Gaza Strip, as well as the West Bank from 
Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria. 
       Following the severance of U.S.-Egyptian 
relations, Egypt was a firmly under the 
influence of the Soviet Union. Faced with the 
embarrassment of Israel’s occupation of the 
Sinai Peninsula, Egypt had closely aligned 	
6 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 10. 
7 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 15.	
8 Saadeddin Ibrahim, “A Socio-cultural Paradigm of 
Pan Arab Leadership: the Case of Nasser,” in 
itself with Soviet influence; further, Gamal 
Nasser’s Arab socialist and anti-imperialist 
policy paid off as it earned Egypt critical 
economic and military support from the Soviet 
Union. Nasser’s regime remained vehemently 
opposed to the pro-western Baghdad Pact, 
further demonstrating the general disdain for 
the United States that Nasser’s regime had 
felt8. 
 DÉTENTE	WITH	THE	UNITED	STATES 
Following Gamal Nasser’s death in 1970, 
however, his successor Anwar Sadat began 
reorienting Egyptian foreign policy towards a 
more pro-western approach. Facing a stagnant 
economy and the continued occupation of the 
Sinai Peninsula, Sadat grew tired of the status 
quo and began making overtures to the west.  
“In mid-1973, he seemed to most 
Egyptians and Arabs a pathetic leader, 
worthy of sympathy rather than anger. But 
the October (1973 Yom Kippur) War later 
that year transformed his image to that of 
an instant national hero… What mattered 
was that Sadat had led the Arabs (with 
Assad of Syria) into a fighting battle with 
an opportunity to defy the enemy and 
vindicate Arab dignity. The October War 
for Sadat could have been what the 1956 
Suez War was for Nasser, baptizing him as 
a pan-Arab leader. However, in the 
following months it gradually emerged 
that the man fought not so much in 
defiance of the West or against what is 
perceived to be the West’s local surrogate 
(Israel), but rather to be accepted in the 
West. He was even suspected of being 
eager to serve, along with Israel and the 
Shah of Iran, as another American 
surrogate in the area”9. 
    While it may be disingenuous to refer to 
Sadat as an American surrogate, his relations 
Leadership and Development in Arab Society, ed. Faud 
Khuri (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 
1981), 49. 
9 Ibrahim, “The Case of Nasser,” 56. 
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with the United States was certainly 
unprecedented in Egyptian history. The 1973 
Yom Kippur War, while ultimately an Israeli 
victory, saw Egyptian troops on the offensive 
for the first time since before Egypt’s 
humiliating defeat in the 1967 Six Day War in 
an initially successful surprise attack against 
Israeli forces. Following the war, a newly 
reinvigorated Sadat had reestablished relations 
with Washington, eventually shirking Moscow 
altogether. “While Anwar Sadat sought 
territory and foreign investment, the White 
House wanted a strategic advantage over the 
Soviet Union. The mutual benefits of a U.S.-
Egyptian alliance only became clear to both 
sides, though, after Sadat took Egypt to 
war”10. 
       Sadat’s shift from a Soviet client state to a 
vital American partner in the region was 
relatively quick, happening within the span of 
only several years. Though a friendship treaty 
had been signed between Cairo and Moscow 
in 1971, Soviet military advisors were 
expelled from Egypt the following year, and 
the friendship treaty itself was abrogated in 
1976, only two years after relations with 
Washington were reestablished. “In March 
1976, in a fresh bid for U.S. military 
assistance, Sadat told Parliament to cancel 
Egypt’s friendship treaty with the USSR. In 
April, he denied Soviet ships access to 
Egyptian ports (although the Soviet Union 
remained, for the time being, Egypt’s largest 
trading partner). After Sadat snubbed Egypt’s 
former patrons in Moscow, Washington began 
selling C-130 military transport aircraft to 
Egypt. Six C-130s were delivered in 1976, but 
only after Kissinger promised Congress that 
the sales would not constitute a precedent and 
that there would be no further Egyptian 
requests for materiel that calendar year. For 
the next fiscal year, bilateral economic aid and 
food subsidies to Egypt would top $1 
billion”11. 
 	
10 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 15.	
SADAT’S	INCREASINGLY	AUTHORITARIAN	TENDENCIES	
While Sadat’s regime was becoming 
increasingly cozy with Washington, Sadat 
began the dual tasks of tightening his grip on 
Egyptian society and securing increasing 
amounts of American weapons and military 
equipment. Somewhat ironically, Cairo’s 
increasing detente with Washington occurred 
simultaneously with Sadat rolling back 
freedoms for the Egyptian people. 
Washington, solely interested in a strong 
military partner in the region to counter Soviet 
influence and eliminating a military threat to 
Israel, generally reacted to Sadat’s growing 
strongman tendencies with apathy. 
       In an attempt to balance Egypt’s budget 
deficit, Sadat cut government subsidies on 
cooking gas, rice, and sugar in 1976, 
increasing the average Egyptian’s cost of 
living by 15%. These subsidy cuts resulted in 
the greatest social unrest seen in Egypt in 
decades, with 30,000 protestors facing off 
with police in Cairo.  
“An estimated eighty people were killed, 
hundreds were wounded, and 1,200 to 
2,000 were arrested. The price revolt 
traumatized Sadat, some say permanently. 
He ‘was 100 percent changed by the 
experience’ and ‘became aggressive,’ 
recalled then minister of defense Abd al-
Ghani Gamassy, who had led the military’s 
intervention. Sadat, who fancied himself to 
be liberalizing Egypt, warned that 
democracy had ‘fangs one hundred times 
sharper than the extraordinary measures’ of 
dictatorship. During a two-hour television 
broadcast on February 3, he pinned the riots 
on Soviet agents and communist remnants 
from Nasser’s administration. Egypt’s 
enemies had exploited the November 1976 
elections to sow doubt and propaganda. In 
order to preserve national unity and prevent 
another “uprising of thieves,” Sadat would 
rollback his earlier reforms, criminalize 
11 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 24. 
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strikes and demonstrations (on penalty of 
life imprisonment with hard labor), and 
confine electoral competition to 
government-sanctioned parties. ‘We hereby 
end one period,’ Sadat proclaimed, ‘and we 
begin a new one.’ A February 10 plebiscite 
approved the measures with a suspicious 
99.4 percent12”. 
 PEACE	WITH	ISRAEL	AND	WARMER	RELATIONS	WITH	WASHINGTON 
Further compounding the situation of the 
Egyptian public’s rights were Sadat’s attempts 
at a lasting, permanent peace with Israel. This 
put Sadat in a tough position as Israel was 
deeply unpopular with not only the Egyptian 
public, but also the Arab world writ large. 
Jordanian and Syrian territory was still under 
Israeli occupation as well as the Sinai 
Peninsula, inviting even more malice directed 
at Israel from nearby Arab states. Despite the 
fierce opposition to peace with Israel, Sadat 
pressed on. Egyptian newspapers critical of 
Israel were shuttered, opposition parties 
suspended operations, and dissident members 
of parliament were expelled in a plebiscite 
with 98.29% of voters approving13. While 
Jimmy Carter’s human rights-focused 
administration “regretted” Sadat’s de-
liberalizing policies, Carter nonetheless 
pushed forward in promoting Israeli-Egyptian 
peace talks. Sadat was at a particular 
disadvantage, with the only concession Israel 
agreeing to being a full Israeli withdrawal 
from the Sinai Peninsula. The West Bank and 
Golan heights would remain under Israeli 
occupation, Israeli settlement activity would 
resume, and Israel would not agree to any 
form of Palestinian self-rule. However, with 
Sadat’s primary goal being an Israeli 
withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and his 
secondary goal being to secure American 
military aid, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty 
was still signed in the White House in 1979. 	
12 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 25. 
13 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 30.	
“On March 17 and 19 (1978), (American 
Secretary of State) Brown concluded the 
details of U.S. military assistance, the 
linchpin of peace… Egypt would get 
$1.5billion “in loans to finance 
procurement through fiscal year 1982 of 
defense articles and defense services,” as 
well as $300,000 in economic assistance. 
The arrangement created an informal norm 
that aid to Israel and Egypt would follow a 
3:2 ratio. On March 26 in Washington, 
Sadat and (Israeli Prime Minister) Begin 
signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 
along with texts covering West Bank 
autonomy talks, normalization of 
Egyptian-Israeli relations, and Egyptian oil 
sales to Israel. The treaty also capped 
Sadat’s long quest for U.S. weaponry. 
That summer, the United States sold Egypt 
“several hundred air-to-air and air-to-
surface missiles,” 550 armored personnel 
carriers, “twelve batteries of Improved 
Hawk air-defense missiles,” and 35F-4E 
Phantom fighter-bombers14”. 
    In the same year that the Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty was signed, Iran, at the time one of the 
United States’ primary partners in the region, 
underwent their 1979 Islamic Revolution, 
ousting the Shah and severing diplomatic ties 
with the United States. With one of the 
primary pillars of American foreign policy on 
the Middle East destroyed, the United States 
became increasingly reliant on Egypt as one of 
its primary partners; Egypt was more than 
willing to fulfill this role in exchange for 
military and economic aid. While Egypt 
became increasingly integrated into American 
foreign policy in the region, Sadat continued 
to become more despotic. While the economy 
was in shambles with inflation hovering 
around an astounding 30 percent, Sadat 
changed the Egyptian constitution through 
rigged plebiscite to establish Islamic law as 
the primary source of legislation, remove the 
14 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 37. 
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presidential term limits that would have 
removed him from power, and criminalize 
transgressive speech15. “Although Carter 
prided himself on being a human rights 
advocate, he refrained from criticizing Sadat 
about his plebiscites, censorship, and police 
repression. In fact, he depended on Sadat’s 
autocratic prerogatives to conclude the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty16”. 	SADAT’S	ASSASSINATION	AND	MUBARAK’S	RISE	TO	POWER	
While Israel slowly withdrew from the 
Sinai Peninsula over the three-year period 
stipulated in the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, 
Sadat increasingly turned Egypt into a 
surveillance state. Concerned about critics of 
the treaty sabotaging peace efforts, Sadat 
significantly increased audio and video 
surveillance while also tripling the amount of 
riot police to 300,000. “In September 1981, 
the Ministry of the Interior arrested or 
detained more than 1,500 party activists and 
leading cultural figures, including the Coptic 
pope and the General Guide of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The dragnet swept up 
secularists, leftists, liberals, and Islamists. One 
victim was a young man in southern Egypt 
named Mohamed Islambouli. On October 6, 
Mohamed’s brother Khaled and three fellow 
Islamic militants assassinated Sadat during a 
military parade commemorating the war in 
1973. Vice President Hosni Mubarak survived 
the shooting and assumed the presidency”17. 
       With the assassination of Anwar Sadat, 
Hosni Mubarak went on to become the 
longest-serving and perhaps most autocratic 
president in Egypt’s history. In office from 
Sadat’s assassination in 1981 leading up to the 
2011 Arab Spring protests that removed him 
from power, Mubarak ruled for nearly thirty 
years by continuing and expanding Sadat’s 
oppressive policies and by further cozying up 
to the United States. 	
15 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention,.40. 
16 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 42.	
	ANTIDEMOCRATIC	COUP	IN	ALGERIA	
In 1991 Algeria, another despotic state in 
North Africa, underwent multiparty 
democratic elections for the first time after 
decades of military rule; candidates from a 
conservative Islamic party, the Fronte 
Islamique du Salat won more than 80% of the 
open seats in Algeria’s parliament. In a move 
that sent a chilling message to Egyptian 
democracy advocates the Algerian military 
froze elections, effectively ensuring that they 
held onto power. The United States, doubtless 
concerned about the geopolitical implications 
of an Islamist party taking power, stood by the 
Algerian military’s antidemocratic coup. As 
then US Secretary of State Jim Baker put it, 
“Generally speaking, when you support 
democracy, you take what democracy gives 
you... If it gives you a radical Islamic 
fundamentalist, you’re supposed to live with 
it. We didn’t live with it in Algeria because 
we felt that the radical fundamentalists’ views 
were so adverse to what we believe in and 
what we support, and to what we under-stood 
the national interests of the United States to 
be”18. 
       To observers in Algeria and Egypt alike, 
the United States’ continued support for the 
Algerian military over the democratically 
elected FIS sent the unfortunate message that 
the United States would continue to support 
entrenched autocrats in order to secure their 
own interests, leaving fledgling democratic 
movements to falter if their interests don’t 
coincide with those of the United States. 
 EGYPT	AND	THE	WAR	ON	TERROR	
However, Mubarak never allowed 
elections as free as those in Algeria that nearly 
brought the FIS to power during his reign. 
Egypt’s 1990 elections were boycotted by 
opposition parties due to blatantly unfair 
election rules and a lack of independent 
17 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 41. 
18 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 59.	
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supervision, leading to an extension of 
Mubarak’s grip on power. Further providing 
Mubarak’s regime with a casus belli against 
opposition to the regime, a group of Egyptian 
radicals with military experience from fighting 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan called the 
Islamic Group attempted to assassinate 
Interior Minister Zaki Badr. This assassination 
attempt, followed by another that mistakenly 
killed Speaker of the Parliament Rifaat 
Mahjub instead, brought Islamist movements 
firmly into the crosshairs of the Egyptian 
security apparatus, triggering increasingly 
bloody crackdowns. Badr defended this 
newfound brutality by claiming “I only want 
to kill one percent of the population”19. 
       Further accentuating the dire situation of 
Islamists in Egypt was the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing in New York City, carried out 
by a Kuwaiti national mentored by Omar 
Abdel Rahman, a radical Egyptian-born cleric 
living in New York. Abdel Rahman was 
sentenced to life in prison for his role in the 
bombing, leaving American officials with the 
impression that supporting Mubarak’s fight 
with Egyptian Islamists could end up leaving 
America safer. Following the bombing, the 
Clinton administration gave Mubarak’s 
security apparatus a key role in the United 
States’ War on Terror against Islamic 
extremists20. An uptick in terror attacks 
carried out by Islamists, such as the United 
States Embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998, led to increasingly 
draconian measures carried out by both the 
United States and Egypt. 
       In 1999, Mubarak addressed Egypt’s 
trajectory while receiving an honorary degree 
from Georgetown University: “The road to 
democracy is a long one, and we travel it with 
confidence. We have not turned back under 
the most difficult conditions, economic 
hardships, social pressures, malicious 	
19 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 59-60. 
20 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 60. 
21 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 67-68. 
terrorism and narrow-minded intolerance. And 
we will not turn back, nor will our belief in the 
rule of law be shaken. We will work towards 
consolidating our democracy gradually, 
steadily, and in the spirit of tolerance and 
cooperation that is known about the Egyptian 
people”. That year, Mubarak was elected to a 
fourth term, and had ruled longer than Nasser 
had21. Mubarak had also exceeded Sadat in the 
number of arrests (25,000 to 19,000), 
casualties from political violence (2,386 to 
250), and accounted for 41% of all Egyptians 
killed or wounded in political violence since 
the 1952 Coup d’état. He was reelected 
president in 1999 by 93.79 percent of the 
vote22. 
 FREEDOM	AGENDA	AND	MULTICANDIDATE	ELECTIONS 
With the election of George W. Bush to 
President of the United States in 2000, his 
trademark Freedom Agenda resulted in a 
continued status quo for democracy and 
opposition activists in Egypt. “Even as Bush 
called on Mubarak to lead the Middle East 
toward democracy, the United States 
depended on the Egyptian president to 
interrogate al-Qaeda suspects, ease U.S. craft 
through Egyptian waters and airspace, and 
keep tabs on Gaza after Israel withdrew. 
Political reform was pushed only so far as it 
helped ensure the post-Mubarak regime would 
be pro-American. Hence, the Freedom Agenda 
was not a turning point for U.S. foreign 
policy, but a variant of the existing 
approach”23.  
       Bush even went as far as to say in 2002 
that “There are some in the world who don’t 
like President Mubarak because of what he 
stands for, a more open society. He’s been a 
great leader of Egypt, and there are extremists 
who don’t like him. And to the extent that we 
can help round up those extremists that would 
22 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 61.	
23 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 70. 
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do harm to the President or his government or 
the people of Egypt, we will do so”24. 
       The military alliance between Cairo and 
Washington proved to be useful to both 
nations during the 2003 Iraq War, where 
Egypt was more than happy to provide free 
access to the Suez Canal for American 
military personnel en route to the Persian 
Gulf. Following Saddam Hussein’s overthrow 
and the discovery that Iraq was not in fact 
harboring weapons of mass destruction, Bush 
framed the invasion as part of his Freedom 
Agenda; a free, democratic Iraq would make 
the Middle East more free. But while the Bush 
Administration was promoting democracy in 
Iraq, it was doing the opposite in Egypt. 
Mubarak was now in his seventies, and 
without a vice president or a clear successor. 
With the American-led Iraq War, and by 
extension American foreign policy in the 
Middle East shown to be extremely unpopular 
with the Egyptian public in opinion polls, a 
shift towards democracy or Mubarak’s death 
or overthrow could very easily lead to a new 
Egyptian government overtly hostile to 
American interests. Indeed, 98 percent of 
Egyptians polled held an unfavorable view of 
the United States. Despite the optics and 
rhetoric, Bush’s Freedom Agenda would in no 
way challenge the status quo in Egypt, and the 
two countries would continue to work together 
militarily25. 
       Following the Iraq War, Egyptian police, 
diplomats, and soldiers continued to receive 
training from the United States in the name of 
counterterrorism, with millions of dollars from 
the US State Department’s Antiterrorism 
Assistance Program being sent to Egyptian 
security forces. These same ‘counterterror’ 
trainees were found in the State Department’s 
2004 human rights report to be responsible for 
“torture, extralegal detention, mass arrest, and 
unlawful killing”26. Had the United States 
been truly bothered by this flagrant abuse of 	
24 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 73.	
25 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 85-86. 
resources that may leave American aid 
culpable for Mubarak’s strong-arm tactics, the 
aid and training could have been cut or 
withdrawn. It never was. 
       Up until 2005, Egyptian elections saw the 
Egyptian public voting either yes or no on a 
single candidate nominated by the Egyptian 
parliament, with the candidate always being 
either Mubarak or his predecessors. Worried 
that parliament could be swayed to nominate 
either his increasingly popular son or another 
charismatic leader, Mubarak asked parliament 
to amend the constitution to allow 
multicandidate presidential elections. Though 
lauded by American officials such as 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the 
election process itself remained as corrupt as 
ever. Opposition leaders were forbidden from 
campaigning, election observation teams were 
prevented from monitoring election sites, 
members of Mubarak’s NDP Party blatantly 
intervened, and government-backed thugs and 
security forces blocked opposition supporters 
from voting. Ayman Nour, leader of the 
opposition el-Ghad Party and the leading 
opposition candidate, was arrested on 
fabricated charges. Mubarak won by a margin 
of 88.6% of the vote, only 5% less than the 
last plebiscite. A US embassy cable cautioned 
that while the elections “undermined 
Mubarak’s credibility as a leader of 
democratic reforms and… strained our ties 
with Egypt… The bedrock of our strategic 
interests with Egypt remains as important as 
ever”27. 	ENTRENCHED,	GRIDLOCKED	POWER 
Egypt’s failure to democratize along with 
its continual trudge on an authoritarian path 
despite growing democratic movements in 
other countries once seemingly inhospitable to 
democracy such as Poland, Mali, Ghana, and 
Argentina is due to issues largely local to 
Egypt rather than any overarching cultural or 
26 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 86.	
27 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 92-96. 
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demographic reasons. Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party, and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s 
military junta following his election in 2014, 
completely refuse to allow any sort of 
opposition movement to freely and fully 
participate in politics28, leaving whichever 
strongman is in power with complete authority 
to run the country as he wishes. Egypt’s 
formidable security forces, backed by 
American training, weapons, and funding, 
have been effectively used to protect the 
interests of Mubarak, and eventually el-Sisi, to 
destroy organized opposition and ensure the 
regime’s power remains unchecked. 
       Mubarak, el-Sisi, and their forebearers 
prevented opposition advocates, be it liberal, 
Islamic, or anything else, from converting 
their popular bases among the Egyptian 
people into political gains. Mubarak’s now-
shuttered National Democratic Party 
effectively provided the only source of 
political advancement available to any 
Egyptian for decades, allowing the party to 
survive any sort of dissent from either the 
Egyptian public or the very few dissident 
party members29. The National Democratic 
Party, or the Egyptian military following el-
Sisi’s rise to power in 2014, also provided a 
mechanism for mediation between Egypt’s 
political elites, preventing defections from the 
party and eliminating any outside political 
movements as opportunities for elites to 
oppose the government.30 
       Egypt’s continued alliance with the 
United States despite the massive 
humanitarian shortcomings of authoritarian 
regimes since Anwar Sadat demonstrates a 
failure on America’s part to effectively 
promote democracy. While American officials 	
28 Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, 
151.	
29 Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, 
156.	
 
30 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 29. 
31 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 29-30. 
have not always remained quiet on their desire 
for Egypt and other Arab states to 
democratize, especially under Bush’s Freedom 
Agenda, Egyptian responses have remained 
cosmetic without making the country any 
more free31. Mubarak’s decision to implement 
multicandidate elections in 2005, for instance, 
was greeted with commendation by American 
officials but ultimately failed to bring about 
any lasting change to Egyptian politics. Even 
after opposition leader Ayman Nour was 
arrested and tortured following these 
supposedly multicandidate elections, 
Washington’s only response was to release a 
press statement calling for Nour’s release 
based on ‘humanitarian concern’32. A visit by 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Egypt 
the following year saw no mention of Nour, 
who remained a prisoner until 2009 and 
eventually had to flee the country. 
       Egypt’s development of a neopatriarchal 
society, defined by Hisham Sharabi as a 
process where a state blends patrimonial 
culture into its institutions33, further limits 
Egypt’s ability to democratize. Dependency 
on the state for economic wellbeing, 
underdevelopment of social and economic 
factors, the ruling regime’s authoritarian 
relationship with the Egyptian public, the 
fragmentation of organized opposition and 
successive defeats of both organized 
opposition and protest movements leave the 
Egyptian people apathetic, depoliticized, and 
demoralized34. In effect, the regime has made 
itself inevitable. 
 INTERFERENCE	FROM	OTHER	ARAB	STATES	
Egypt is far from the only autocracy in the 
region, with other conservative monarchies, 
32 Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement on 
Conviction of Egyptian Politician Ayman Nour,” The 
White House, December 2005, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512
24-1.html. 
33 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 31-32. 	
34 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 33. 
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military dictatorships, and other forms of 
totalitarian governments all tangled in a 
political web, especially following the events 
of the 2011 Arab Spring revolts. 
Demonstrating just how interconnected the 
Arab world is, the UAE was accused by 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood elements of 
granting refuge to criminals from Mubarak’s 
regime, including former prime minister 
Ahmad Shafiq after losing the 2012 
presidential election. Shafiq faced charges of 
corruption for his role in Mubarak’s regime35. 
“With mass protests in Bahrain in spring 
2011, and smaller protest movements in Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait, the GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council) states decided on a 
common strategy toward the Arab Spring 
abroad and the protests at home: protests in 
other Arab states could be supported if this 
served geopolitical interests, but there was 
zero tolerance for protests or demands for 
reform at home, where security and stability 
remained priority number one”36. The various 
Gulf States drew from different types of 
support; Saudi Arabia opposed the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which is banned in Saudi 
Arabia, in favor of Wahabi elements more in 
line with the Saudi’s interests; the UAE 
remained opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and welcomed important officials from 
Mubarak’s regime after its downfall; sensing 
an opportunity to increase its influence at the 
expense of other Gulf states, Qatar largely 
backed the Muslim Brotherhood37 
 REIGION	AND	AUTOCRACY	
The reason for sustained popular support 
for Islamic movements in Egypt is primarily 
derived from political and economic 	
35 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf : Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford Briefs, 2013), 116. 
36 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 118.	
37 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 119. 
38 Mark Tessler, “The Origins of Popular Support for 
Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis” in 
Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed. 
circumstances, rather than that of religious and 
cultural traditions. In the words of a young 
Algerian that supported the soon-to-be 
overthrown FIS, “In this country, if you are a 
young man… you only have four choices: you 
can remain unemployed and celibate because 
there are no jobs and no apartments to live in; 
you can work in the black market and risk 
being arrested; you can try to emigrate to 
France to sweep the streets of Paris or 
Marseilles; or you can join the FIS and vote 
for Islam”38. Faced with a dauntingly stubborn 
status quo that leaves the majority of 
Egyptians in relative poverty while the elites 
continue to thrive, Egyptians turn to Islamic 
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
‘Rais’, the Arabic translation of 
‘president’, more directly translates to a 
person in a leadership position as the head of a 
group, leaving the term ‘president-for-life’ not 
as alien to an Egyptian or a Tunisian as it may 
be for an American39. Rachid al-Ghannouchi, 
a Tunisian politician, argued that since North 
African elite “speak a different political 
language from the masses, there will 
inevitably be an authoritarian dictator. In other 
words, the processes of Westernization as 
experienced in North Africa in the past 
century lead not to democracy but to 
authoritarianism. What is needed in order to 
transcend that situation is a program that can 
bridge the gap between the elite and the 
masses- and this can be provided by Islam”40. 
      As demonstrated by the success of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the 2012 Egyptian 
elections, Islamic populist opposition to 
authoritarian regimes in the Arab world are 
demonstrated to be willing to work within 
flawed, existing political structures in order to 
John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), 93. 
39 John Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents: The 
Islamic Community and the State in North Africa,” in 
Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed. 
John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), 12.	
40 Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 14. 
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promote democratic processes41. Despite 
western support for ‘risk-free democracies’ 
where, according to John L. Esposito, 
“opposition parties and groups are tolerated as 
long as they remain relatively weak or under 
government control and do not threaten the 
ruling group”42, Mohamed Morsi 
demonstrated that truly free elections can 
bring Islamic leaders opposed to Western 
influences into power. 
       While political parties with doctrine based 
in Islamic ideology have problems of their 
own that are best addressed in a different 
paper, they often provide the best, if not the 
only legitimate opposition to Middle Eastern 
autocracies, with the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt serving as no exception. Michael 
Hudson, a political scientist focused with the 
Middle East, wrote that democracy is not an 
“ideal condition but… a process through 
which the exercise of political power by 
regime and state becomes less arbitrary, 
exclusive, and authoritarian”43. Despite the 
staggeringly broad array of values and politics 
that various Islamic factions prescribe to, 
Islamic parties in Egypt represent a chance at 
achieving Hudson’s view of democracy. 
While Morsi’s brief presidency was certainly 
flawed and not without its own autocratic 
tinges, it was not was not anymore 
antidemocratic than other regimes in transition 
from autocratic rule44. “Ideas of just rule, 
religious or otherwise, are not fixed, even if 
some radicals claim that they are. Such 
notions are debated, argued, often fought 
about, and re-formed in practice. The issue is 
not whether such debates are occurring but 
how to recognize their contours, as well as the 
obstacles and the false starts, both internal and 	
41 Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 8. 
42 Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 9. 
43 Dale Eickleman, “Muslim Politics: The Prospects for 
Democracy in North Africa and the Middle East,” in 
Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed. 
John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), 19. 
external, to making governance less arbitrary 
and authoritarian”45. 
 CONCLUSION	
The threads leading to the prevention of 
democracy in Egypt are incredibly complex 
and deeply entangled with one another. 
Foreign support for oppressive Egyptian 
regimes, frequently originating from the 
United States or other Arab states, prop up 
“stable” dictatorships while leaving 
democratic activists to their own devices. 
Ironically, Egypt’s key position as an 
American ally in the War on Terror in the 
regime has been used by Egyptian officials as 
an opportunity to promote increasingly 
draconian and authoritarian measures, with 
government officials free to act without 
interference from either their American or 
Gulf allies or the Egyptian public.  
       However, as suggested by the Arab 
Spring revolt in 2011 and other instances of 
autocracies collapsing in similar countries in 
the region, democracy remains a possibility 
for the nation. Mubarak’s thirty one-year reign 
was ended by mass protests in the streets, as 
was Morsi’s presidency. The Egyptian people, 
oppressed for decades, demonstrated once that 
they were tired of inefficient, autocratic rule. 
It remains to be seen if the same level of 
protests can be seen under the increasingly 
despotic rule of General el-Sisi. 
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